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Mitchell: In (Slightly Uncomfortable) Defense of "Triage" by Public Defende

IN (SLIGHTLY UNCOMFORTABLE) DEFENSE
OF “TRIAGE” BY PUBLIC DEFENDERS
John B. Mitchell *
Since the mid-1970’s when I first read Professor Freedman’s article
on The Three Hardest Questions,1 I have been a fan. Following his work
from then to now, I have always appreciated how he truly understands
the complex reality of the trial courts and the world of those attorneys
who work in that system, that he always espouses the ethical high
ground within that reality, and that he is willing to make tough, even
controversial, stances regarding what he believes is right. In An Ethical
Manifesto for Public Defenders,2 I find my theory of triage3 as the object of
Professor Freedman’s ethical disapproval.4
Given what I have already said, it should not be surprising that I
agree with most of what Professor Freedman writes concerning the ills of
criminal public defense. Public defense is terribly under funded,5 with
Public Defenders carrying staggeringly high caseloads.6 I further agree
that, while Gideon v. Wainwright7 does not guarantee an attorney as
talented and with as many supporting resources as the wealthiest client
could retain,8 Gideon does guarantee an attorney with both the requisite
skills and sufficient time to employ those unique skills.
Finally, I agree that in Strickland v. Washington,9 the United States
Supreme Court effectively ensured that Sixth Amendment Constitutional
guarantees will play no role in either enforcing basic levels of attorney
competence or in even recognizing the reality of institutional defense
players. Mocking Gideon, the Strickland court mixes a “presumption” of
competence,10 an onerous two-part test (under which you functionally
*
Associate Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law, J.D. 1970, Stanford Law
School.
The author wishes to thank Phyllis Brazier for her fabulous word processing under a
very tight time table.
1
Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966).
2
Monroe H. Freedman, An Ethical Manifesto for Public Defenders, 39 VAL. U. L. REV 911
(2005) [hereinafter Manifesto].
3
See, John B. Mitchell, Redefining the Sixth Amendment, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1215 (1994).
4
Freedman, Manifesto, supra note 2, at 914-18.
5
Mitchell, supra note 3, at 1218 n.11, 1219 n.19.
6
Id., at 1241 n.96.
7
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).
8
Mitchell, supra note 3, at 1254, 1286 n.214.
9
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
10
Id. at 689, 690.
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have to demonstrate you would have been acquitted but for the
incompetence),11 a refusal to incorporate ABA standards into
constitutional standards for competence,12 and de facto the removal of
anything that can be characterized as “strategic” (even if seemingly
stupid) from consideration in a Sixth Amendment analysis.13 The result
is one that, even in the best light, can be seen as totally abdicating the
responsibility for public defense attorney competence under the Sixth
Amendment, and placing it on local bar associations and law schools
(which, of course, cannot order county councils or state legislatures to
address competence issues tied to inadequate resources). Taking a less
generous view, Strickland insures a “cover-up” of the unjustifiable under
funding of public defense.
Where Professor Freedman and I differ is in our approach to this
shameful reality. Professor Freedman would have public defenders take
the system head on, if necessary heroically going down fighting like the
ancient Greeks at Thermopylae.14
In contrast, I consider myself an “optimistic realist”: I hope for a
better world, while planning for the one we have. And it is this present
world that my ideas about triage address.
Unlike private practice, where additional resources can be added in
response to additional client funds (including adding associates, contract
attorneys, and paralegals),15 public defense is a zero-sum game.
Whatever resources are added to one public defense client’s defense will
not be available to another.16 And significant additional public funds are
simply not forthcoming to increase the public defense pie.17 I, therefore,
am back to square one; i.e., triage.18

Id. at 695-96.
Id. at 688-89.
13
Id. at 699.
14
The heroic stand of the Spartans against an overwhelming Persian Force is recounted
in THE HISTORY OF HERODOTUS (translated by George Rawlinson), in GREAT BOOKS 253,
¶ 207 (1996).
15
Mitchell, supra note 3, at 1244.
16
Though, in fact, all lawyering involves some rationing. Id. at 1243.
17
In fact, the entire criminal justice system is starved for resources. Id. at 1218 n.12.
18
Moreover, even if additional public funds earmarked for hiring dozens of new public
defenders magically appeared and, therefore, significantly reduced caseloads were a
reality, public defenders would still need to ration their “credibility”. While a private
practitioner can come into court every week or so extolling their particular client’s virtues,
even with a dramatically reduced caseload a public defender cannot make the same claim
for each of their five-to-ten clients each day, day after day. Id. at 1244.
11
12
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Given Professor Freedman and my strong areas of congruence, I
want to limit my response to the following three specific points of
divergence:
1) It is possible that, noble intentions aside, if put into action
Professor Freedman’s proposal would trigger a variety of
institutional responses actually harmful to existing criminal
defendants.
2) Even if Professor Freedman’s ethical mandate was implemented
and successful, there would be a time of transition during which
public defenders would still need to engage in triage.
3) Finally, my notion of “pattern representation” is far more
involved and effective than represented in Professor Freedman’s
article.
A. Following Professor Freedman’s Course of Action, Public Defenders Could
in Fact Prompt Institutional Responses Harmful to Criminal Defendant
Played out within a system with two powerful institutional players
other than the public defenders, judges and prosecutors, it is not clear
that Professor Freedman’s most sincere intentions will actually inure to
the benefit of criminal defendants.
Let me focus on Professor
Freedman’s stance on the overloaded public defender and plea
bargaining. As we are all aware, at least 90% of cases are resolved
without any trial by some form of plea bargain.19 These bargains then
are effectively sealed from review by the ritual of the plea litany (i.e.,
putting on the record that the defendant recognizes all the constitutional
rights she is waiving).20 This obviously is not a mechanism that judges
or prosecutors want to see interfered with in any significant way.
In this plea-bargaining realm, Professor Freedman requires a public
defender who believes she has too many cases to competently represent
each client to convey any plea offers by the prosecution,21 but to then tell
the client that she cannot advise the client about the deal, because she is
incompetent to do so.22 If the client decides to nonetheless take the plea,
Mitchell, supra note 3, at 1228 n.52.
See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (stating the Court must inform the defendant
of constitutional Rights being waived by pleading guilty and defendant must waive rights
on record). See also, FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (detailing the procedure for accepting pleas in
Federal Court).
21
Freedman, Manifesto, supra note 2, at 922.
22
Id.
19
20
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the public defender must put on the record of the plea hearing that
counsel did not advise the client because she was incompetent to do so
due to her caseload.23
Will judges and prosecutors feel shame at seeing such a pure display
of ethical integrity24 and join the public defenders in a Gideon love fest?
Not necessarily.
Prosecutors might respond with a form of
brinkmanship akin to going “all-in” in a game of Texas Hold-em poker.
While prosecutors depend on plea bargaining to stay on top of their own
caseloads, in the short run they hold a great deal of power over
individual defendants. This is particularly so when the deal on the table
is dramatically better than the sentence the defendant reasonably could
receive after conviction at trial, or when the crime reduction offered by
the prosecutor has far less stigma than the charged crime (e.g., amend
complaint to add theft, defendant pleads to theft, armed robbery
dismissed). Whether or not the defendant is out of custody on bail will
be another factor weighing in on the prosecutor’s power in any
particular case. This is especially so when the prosecutor is ready to
offer a deal of “time served,” and a plea will thus be followed by
immediate release from custody.
Given this power, once the prosecutor realizes what the public
defender is doing, he may simply refuse to bargain. “I’m not making
any offer. There’s no point. If you refuse to advise your client, your
client has not received competent representation. While reversal still
may not be required under Strickland because your client will not be able
to show prejudice, I really don’t feel like taking the chance. In fact, I
think you have the obligation to tell your client that he has the choice of
representing himself under Faretta,25 and if he does, he can bargain with
me face to face.”

Id.
At a minimum, Professor Freedman’s requirements for ethical action by public
defenders can only be institutionally meaningful if the entire public defenders office stands
together on the contention that their caseloads prevent representation that would satisfy
the Sixth Amendment. Otherwise, the one or two public defenders who stand up will be
reassigned out of criminal trial courts, put on leave, or fired. Professor Freedman
recognized this, but believes that being a professional means putting your responsibilities
to your client “above your own financial concerns”. Id. at 922 n.75. To me that seems a
disproportionate price for accomplishing no more than being able to say you did the right
thing. Others, on the other hand, may feel that that is all that matters.
25
See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (holding a criminal defendant has a
constitutional right to represent himself).
23
24
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What is the client to do now? The defendant has no constitutional
right to a plea bargain26 and, in fact, any agreement under these
circumstances would appear to violate the Sixth Amendment. Of course,
the defendant could waive her right to counsel and take the deal; but
self-representation is as far away from the promise of Gideon as one can
imagine. On the other hand, the defendant could force the issue and go
to trial, but she would face all the risks attendant with the possibility of a
conviction, as well as one additional problem. Who would defend her?
If the public defender is not even competent to advise her on the plea
bargain, it is hard to imagine how that same attorney suddenly could be
competent to actually represent the client in a jury trial. The client could
just “plead to the sheet” (i.e., plead to all charges) and rely on the mercy
of the court and/or some sentencing “discount” for pleading to give a
lower sentence than would be given after conviction at trial, but it is
difficult to locate the promise of Gideon in this scenario.
Similarly, if the public defender faces down the court, putting on the
record that she did not advise the client on the deal because she was
incompetent to do so due to her caseload, the judge simply will refuse to
accept the bargain. After all, the common form of the plea literacy is
“has your attorney advised you that [court then lists rights being
waived]?” If the client protests at the court’s refusal to accept the plea,
will the judge tell her about her right to self-representation? Or will the
court bring in private attorneys from the conflicts panel, and perhaps
even get some emergency funds to pay a panel of attorneys with little or
no criminal defense experience, to do some perfunctory interviewing
and discovery review (with investigation in an unusual case) in order to
advise clients and get the plea system back on track? If that happens, all
that will be accomplished is that many defendants will remain in jail27

26
In fact, a few jurisdictions have forbidden plea bargaining in most circumstances. See,
e.g., Michael L. Rubinstein & Teresa J. White, Alaska’s Ban on Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 367 (1979).
27
While under normal circumstances, state speedy trial rules would prevent extensive
pretrial incarceration, all those rules have “safety valves “that allow extension of speedy
trial timeframes if good cause reasons (out of control of the court and prosecutor) prevent
getting the trial commenced in time. See, e.g., WASH. CT. R., CRLJ (d)(8) (West 2004)
(“When a trial is not begun on the date set because of unavoidable or unforseeable
circumstances beyond the control of the court or the parties the court, even if the time for
trial has expired, may extend the time within which the trial must be held. . . .”). A sudden
revolt by all public defenders would plainly constitute such good cause, at least until
reasonable, alternative representation can be arranged. Of course, realistically one would
expect all this to initially be preceded by an emergency meeting called by the judges with
the heads of the public defenders office, where some minor concessions would have been
offered and rejected.
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awaiting a visit by an attorney likely far less competent than their public
defender.
Finally, imagine what it would be like for a client if her attorney told
her that the attorney is not competent and will not give any legal advice
about the plea offer. What is the client to make of this? To begin with,
clients tend not to trust public defenders anyway, thinking that they are
part of the system and not competent.28 Now their attorney actually
confesses incompetence, and refuse to help the client. This is a parody of
the worst image indigent clients have of public defenders.
Appropriately, the client should respond, “Why do I even have you as
an attorney if you aren’t even going to help me? . . . I want another
attorney. I want an attorney who will help me!” Of course, Professor
Freedman’s attorney will have to respond: “There is no other attorney
who will do anything different. Our entire office is committed to doing
the same. Let me explain why. Even though it might be against your
best interest in your particular case, all of us in this office are doing this
because . . .” So, if the client is at all rational and self-interested, they will
insist that they go back to court with their “attorney” and seek the
court’s help. Assuming again a system-wide stance by the entire public
defender’s office, the court will have no choice but to call in the panels of
experienced and inexperienced attorneys I’ve just discussed. In the end,
the clients are unlikely to feel part of some noble struggle on behalf of
the Sixth Amendment. Instead they are likely to believe that they are
nothing but pawns in some “game” between the public defender,
prosecution and judges, and only feel further disillusionment towards
the criminal justice system.
B. Even if Professor Freedman’s Position Were Successfully Implemented,
During the Inevitable Transition Public Defenders Would Still Need to
Practice Triage of the Type I Have Suggested
Let’s imagine that society’s legal and political institutions positively
responded to an unbending phalanx of public defenders standing by the
letter of their ethical code. The response could take a variety of forms
that, singularly or in combination, result in substantially lower caseloads
for individual public defenders. Initially, there are only two basic
strategies to accomplish this end: more public defenders and/or fewer
overall cases in the system. The former merely requires more public
funds to hire more public defenders. The latter could be accomplished
through a mix of legislative decriminalization of certain crimes, more
28
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robust prosecution screening of cases for filing, and even alteration of
police arrest priorities on the street.
Whether this victory for the promise of Gideon results from legal
fiat,29 or the more likely avenue of institutional negotiations with the
public defender’s office, it is difficult to see how a sudden caseload
ceiling of, e.g., no more than “X” felonies or “Y” misdemeanors could
immediately go into effect. Lowering the number of cases per attorney
does not change the fact that the system is already filled with criminal
defendants (many who are in jail because they cannot make bail), with
more entering every day. Who will represent all these defendants who
formerly would have been added to some public defender’s
backbreaking caseload?
The courts could fill the ranks of public defenders to meet this gap in
the transition by “drafting” members of the bar under a theory of
mandatory pro bono.30 Legal challenges to this action under claims of
involuntary servitude and taking without compensation aside,31 this
dramatic action would likely suffer from two problems. First, elected
state judges might hesitate to conscript transactional lawyers from large
corporate law firms; while to only troll the ranks of small and solo
practitioners, leaving the large firms alone, would be certain to have
instant political, if not legal, ramifications. Secondly, and more
importantly, most of the new attorneys thrown into the fray would know
almost nothing about the criminal justice system, criminal procedure, or
criminal litigation. “I know you’ve watched Law & Order, so here’s a
robbery case where the defendant is facing five-to-life. Go get ‘em.”

29
Unless relying on independent state constitutional grounds, courts are not likely to
find automatic violations of the Sixth Amendment based solely on caseloads. The
Strickland analysis requires a showing of actual prejudice, a determination that must be
made on a case-by-case basis. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). While
Professor Freedman characterizes the caseload problem as one of a “conflict of interest,”
and true conflict of interest brought to the trial court’s attention does constitute per se
incompetence, it is difficult to imagine a court making this determination by relying solely
on some bright line numeric quantum of cases. Freedman, Manifesto, supra note 2, at 920;
see Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489 (1978). Such a caseload, when added to
concrete testimony by an individual public defender might, on the other hand, be sufficient
for a legal ruling of incompetence in a particular case.
30
See Patrick Harris, Let’s Make Lawyers Happy: Advocating Mandatory Pro Bono, N. ILL.
U.L. REV. 287 (1999) (providing a good outline of the grounds justifying mandatory pro
bono).
31
See Jennifer Murray, Lawyers Do It for Free?: An Examination of Mandatory Pro Bono, 29,
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1141, 1157-63 (1998) (offering a discussion of the constitutional claims
against mandatory pro bono.
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Even if the court decided not to pursue the path of mandatory pro
bono, instead obtaining emergency funds from state or local government
to offer money to members of the bar to “take on a few clients,” this
problem of competent representation would not be solved, and might in
fact even be exacerbated. For the attorneys who would be drawn to
what would like be relatively small fees would largely be comprised of
beginning attorneys trying to get some experience and volume practices
that carefully calculate time spent to remuneration.
Alternatively, the court and prosecutor could decide that they will
deal with the gap between the number of existing defendants, and
available public defenders (given the new caseload caps), by dismissing
“without prejudice” a sufficient number of “less serious” cases.
Incoming cases could similarly be controlled by not filing the less serious
cases. (The prosecutor would then have the term of the Statute of
Limitations to subsequently file or refile.) But that’s still a great number
of fairly serious criminal cases not being processed. Would police then
stop arresting for a significant number of crimes because they know that
they will not be charged? Will word then get out on the streets that you
can commit certain crimes with impunity? Also, if we are not willing to
give a permanent free pass from prosecution to all the legitimate cases
that either were not filled or were dismissed “without prejudice,” these
cases represent a large backlog of cases. Even when the public
defender’s resources are finally at a level that Professor Freedman would
find properly reflective of Gideon, this as yet uncharged backlog would
threaten to again swap the system.
Therefore, one would expect that any mandatory to cap on public
defender caseloads, whether as the result of legal decision or
institutional negotiation, will take the form of a target that is achieved at
the end of set of checkpoints in a staged timetable. That means that for a
significant period of time (at least months) public defender caseloads
will not be likely to dramatically change. That means triage—focus and
“pattern representation”.
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C. A Careful Look at “Pattern Representation” as Competent Representation
In my system of triage for the lower criminal courts,32 public
defenders would allocate their limited resources between those cases on
which they would focus33 and those that would be provided pattern
representation.34 While I equate focus with the work of good attorneys
with reasonable caseloads, it is not a quantifiable resource. It is rather a
commitment of mental resources that, depending on how the actual case
unfolds, may be employed every step of the way through trial or may
never even be called upon (such as when the prosecutor chooses to
dismiss early in the process). It is my contention that “pattern
representation” for those cases not chosen for focus nevertheless can
constitute basic, competent representation under the Sixth Amendment.
It is that contention that is the target of Professor Freedman’s strong
disagreement with my theory of triage.
There are a number of aspects of my concept of pattern
representation that I now see I must make clearer, and I take full
responsibility for any misunderstandings by others reading my previous
work. I believe that pattern representation, if done correctly, can satisfy
the constitution; but not because it would satisfy the Strickland standard.
Of course it would satisfy Strickland, since it seems possible that
consulting an Ouija-board for strategic decisions could pass
constitutional muster under that case. Rather, pattern representation
satisfies Gideon because it is not “perfunctory”,35 a matter of just going
through a ritualized set of motions. Nor is it a “hasty label and
bargaining without investigation and research.”36 Pattern representation
does not mean a glance through the police report, then a plea.
Pattern representation does begin with the police report because,
while often not providing an accurate account of the defendant’s story,
32
When I wrote my triage article, my specific concern was with the lower misdemeanor
courts, and the fact that these courts did not work. I only focused on public defenders as
one “piece” of that system (in addition to prosecutors with their charging and plea
bargaining power, and judges). Mitchell, supra note 3, at 1215, 1222-23. I therefore did not
consider the superior courts and felony cases. In contrast to most misdemeanors, all
felonies are “serious” and tend to be factually more complex than misdemeanors (in the
sense that, except for DUI cases, forensic expert witnesses are rare in the lower courts, and
that there generally is far more police investigation and, correspondingly, often more
witnesses). If applied to felonies, my concept of “pattern representation” must be adjusted
accordingly, which I have not yet endeavored to do.
33
Id. at 1302-18.
34
Id. at 1293-02.
35
Freedman, Manifesto, supra note 2, at 914.
36
Id. at 918.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2005

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 4 [2005], Art. 5

934

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

the police report does provide a generally decent view of the
prosecution’s case. So a “pattern” view of the police report allows a
competent advocate to quickly see potential case theories and spot
potential legal issue for possible motions. From this, the public defender
can quickly construct the contours (including a “list” of significant
factual variables that must be determined) of a “reasonable doubt” case;
i.e., case focused on the prosecution’s case and its high burden of proof.
Professor Freedman mistakenly equates my notion of pattern
representation with the tendency of judges in the inquisitorial system to
jump to early judgments, which then tend to lead the judges to discount
subsequent information inconsistent with their initial view of the case.37
While there may be come cognitive relationship between this process
and my notion of pattern representation, they are very different. The
cognitive phenomenon Professor Freedman is discussing concerning
judges in the inquisitorial system would be familiar to any of those who
analyze the decision making processes of fact finders under the lens of
narrative38 or schema theory.39 Under these theories, jurors make sense
of trial testimony by placing it into cognitive structures (schema theory)
that we call “stories” (narrative theory).40 From the moment when the
jurors arrive at their chosen story as to what happened, jurors select
subsequent information consistent with their story, and ignore or
discount subsequent information that is inconsistent.41 This is precisely
what was happening with the inquisitorial judges Professor Freedman
discusses.
Unlike this cognitive process of fact finders at trial, when engaging
in pattern representation I am not making judgments about “what
happened.” I am retrieving what are in effect checklists stored in my
expert schema for the particular type of case (although the items on the
“checklist” are likely to take the form of factual scenarios that I “see,”
rather than some two-dimensional list.) Admittedly, the patterns I see
will limit the checklist(s) I retrieve, and the content of each checklist in
turn will be limited by my prior experience, education, imagination,
discussions with colleagues,and such; yet these patterns are nonetheless
Id. at 915.
See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971, 1043 (1991);
Mitchell, supra note 3, at 1305 n.253.
39
See, e.g., Albert J. Moore, Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37 UCLA L.
REV. 273 (1989).
40
Lance Bennett & Martha Feldman, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM
(1981).
41
See Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making:
The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 521, 525 (1991).
37
38
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the tools of an expert advocate, not the judgmental process of a fact
finder.
Thus, for example, if a young public defender tells me that she has
her first case involving a car, passengers, and constructive possession of
a baggie of marijuana found in the car, I quickly “see” a range of options,
issues, lines of questioning and arguments that she will struggle to
construct absent a great deal of preparation. It’s not that I’m so smart; I
just have a great deal of information stored, organized, and retrievable
from my expert schema that is triggered by recognizing the patterns
raised by this scenario.42 And employing these patterns, I will do
motions, discovery, and investigation; albeit pin-pointed and limited by
the particular pattern.
•

Why did the police stop the car? How did they eventually find
the drugs? [I might be able to bring a suppression motion for a
Fourth Amendment violation.]

•

Whose car was it? To whom is it registered? Who was driving?
[If my client is a passenger, the prosecution’s case is more
vulnerable; if he’s a hitchhiker, even better.]

•

Where were the drugs found? Console? Glove box? Trunk?
Under a seat? In the open? [This is relevant to my client’s
knowledge, access and control.]

•

Does anything tie my client to the drugs beside mere proximity?
Fingerprints on baggie? Drugs on his person? Paraphernalia,
rolling papers, etc. on his person? Client appears under
influence of drugs? Smell of drugs in car? [Absence of these
“ties” weakens prosecution’s case for dominion and control;
presence of any of these makes case less triable.]

•

How did the client behave with the police? Cooperative?
Uncooperative?
“Furtive”
as
police
approached?
[Circumstantial evidence adding to the guilt or innocence side of
the scale.]

While this is difficult for inexperienced new attorneys, as the result of Clinics,
Externships, and bar rules permitting actual practice by supervised law students, new
attorneys are entering the practice with far more real world experience than their
predecessors. As such, they have amassed a growing repertoire of patterns.

42

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2005

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 4 [2005], Art. 5

936

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

•

Any obvious problems with the forensic lab, or required
certifications in the lab reports? [You never know.]

•

Has your client or anyone else in the car made a statement? [If
your client has made a harmful statement, are there Fourth
Amendment or Miranda43 lines of attack available? If a codefendant is turning on your client, is there a “deal” and/or
criminal history you can use to impeach the witness?]

Using this approach, a competent attorney can give a decent defense.44
Most of the answers to the factual variables (e.g., where the drugs were
found) can be found by reviewing the police report and attached
statements, through information obtained by a discovery motion created
on computer form or provided in “open file” discovery, and/or from a
telephone conversation with the police (they often have very weird
hours). If the officer adds incriminating information not in the report
(e.g., she smelled marijuana in the car), I can impeach based on this
serious “omission” from the original report.
Pattern representation cannot make “winners” out of “losers.” You
need focus to do that. But, again, I believe it is competent. In fact, it is
precisely because of these patterns in a public defender’s repertoire,
which then are used in conjunction with their knowledge of the local
system, their awareness of the likely range of deals in particular types of
case situations, and their personal experience with individual
prosecutors and judges, that public defenders tend to do at least as well
for their clients as private defense attorneys.45
D. Conclusion
Everyday when I skim through the paper it’s the same. The states
have no money to build new public schools, no money for teachers, no
money for graduate schools, no money for social services, no money for
repairing worn-out infrastructure, no money for police, no money for
homeland security. Defense of the indigent criminally accused surely
falls far, far below any of these areas on the list of community concerns.
Even if public defender after public defender poured gasoline on
themselves and lighted themselves on fire in open court in dramatic
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Interestingly, prosecutors often have detailed manuals laying out a pattern-like
approach to litigating particular types of cases, including common legal issues, witnesses
to call, and a list of questions to ask the witnesses on direct examination.
45
Mitchell, supra note 3, at 57.
43
44
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protest, I do not believe that substantial resources would be forthcoming.
That means triage. The only question is whether it will be conducted
haphazardly, or according to some set of rational principles based on
ethical theory.
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